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Abstract
The connections between nonmonotonic reason-
ing and belief revision are well-known. A central
problem in the area of nonmonotonic reasoning
is the problem of default entailment, i.e., when
should an item of default information represent-
ing “if θ is true then, normally, φ is true” be said
to follow from a given set of items of such infor-
mation. Many answers to this question have been
proposed but, surprisingly, virtually none have at-
tempted any explicit connection to belief revision.
The aim of this paper is to give an example of how
such a connection can be made by showing how
the lexicographic closure of a set of defaults may
be conceptualised as a process of iterated revision
by sets of sentences. Specifically we use the revi-
sion method of Nayak.
Introduction and Preliminaries
The methodological connections between the areas of
nonmonotonic reasoning, i.e., the process by which an
agent may, possibly, withdraw previously derived con-
clusions upon enlarging her set of hypotheses (Makin-
son 1994), and belief revision, i.e., the process by which
an agent changes her beliefs upon discovering some
new information (Alchourr´on, Ga¨rdenfors, & Makinson
1985; Ga¨rdenfors 1988), are well-known (see, for exam-
ple, (Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson 1994; Ga¨rdenfors & Rott
1995; Makinson & Ga¨rdenfors 1991; Rott 1996)). As a
consequence, it is possible to translate particular prob-
lems in one area into problems in the other. One partic-
ular problem in nonmonotonic reasoning is the question
of default entailment, i.e., when should we regard one
item of so-called “default knowledge” (hereafter just
“default”), i.e., an expression of the form θ ⇒ φ stand-
ing for “if θ then normally (or usually, or typically) φ”,
as “following from” a given set of defaults. Several an-
swers to this question have been proposed in the litera-
ture (such as in (Benferhat et al. 1993; Benferhat, Saf-
fiotti, & Smets 1995; Goldszmidt, Morris, & Pearl 1993;
Lehmann 1995; Lehmann & Magidor 1992; Pearl 1990;
Weydert 1996), to name but a few) but none of them
(with the exception of the last named) seem to attempt
any explicit connection with belief revision. The aim
of this paper is to make a start on such a connection
by showing how one particular method of default en-
tailment, namely the lexicographic closure construction
(Benferhat et al. 1993; Lehmann 1995) can be given a
formulation in terms of a certain method of belief revi-
sion which was first given in (Nayak 1994) and studied
further in (Nayak, Nelson, & Polansky 1996). In the
process, we uncover one or two interesting avenues for
further research on both sides.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Firstly, in the
next section we formally pose the basic question of de-
fault entailment outlined above and describe the lexi-
cographic closure. The set of defaults defined by the
lexicographic closure, considered as a binary relation,
forms a rational consequence relation (in the sense of
(Kraus, Lehmann, & Magidor 1990)). The section fol-
lowing this introduces the theory of belief revision and
the important notion of epistemic entrenchment rela-
tion (E-relation for short) which it utilises. Also in
this section we describe the correspondence between E-
relations and rational consequence relations. Next, with
the aid of this correspondence, we describe Nayak’s op-
eration of revision. Nayak proposes to model revision
of an epistemic state (represented as an E-relation) by
an arbitrary set of sentences by first converting this set
into an E-relation and then revising by this relation.
We present one particular method for generating an
E-relation from a set of sentences and show our main
result: that, given this method, the E-relation corre-
sponding to the lexicographic closure can be obtained
by revising the initial epistemic state (which we take to
be the E-relation in which the only sentences believed
are the tautologies) firstly by the set of (the material
counterparts of) those defaults which are the least spe-
cific, then those defaults which are the next-least spe-
cific and so on up to the set of the most specific defaults.
After this we give our ideas for possible further study
before offering some short concluding remarks.
Before we get started, let us fix our notation.
Throughout this paper, L is an arbitrary but fixed
propositional language built up from a finite set of
propositional variables using the usual connectives
¬,∧,∨,→,⊤ and ⊥. Semantics is provided by the (fi-
nite) set W of propositional worlds. For θ ∈ L we set
Sθ = {w ∈ W | w |= θ}, i.e., Sθ is the set of worlds
which satisfy θ. Given E ∪ {φ} ⊆ L we write E |= φ
whenever
⋂
θ∈E Sθ ⊆ Sφ and let Cn(E) denote the set
{φ | E |= φ}. As usual we write θ |= φ rather than
{θ} |= φ etc. while, for any w ∈ W and E ⊆ L we set
sentE(w) = {θ ∈ E | w |= θ}. Finally, for an arbitrary
set X we use |X | to denote the cardinality of X .
The Lexicographic Closure of a Set of
Defaults
Suppose we have somehow learnt that an intel-
ligent agent believes some finite set of defaults
∆ = {λi ⇒ χi | λi, χi ∈ L, i = 1, . . . , l}. In this case
what other assertions of this form should we conclude
our agent believes? Or, put another way, what is the
binary relation |∼∆ on L where θ |∼∆ φ holds iff we
can conclude, on the basis of ∆, that if θ is true then,
normally, φ is also true? In this paper, one answer to
this question which we are particularly interested in is
the lexicographic closure construction which was pro-
posed independently in both (Benferhat et al. 1993)
and (Lehmann 1995). We describe this construction
now.
Throughout this paper we assume that ∆ is an arbi-
trary but fixed, finite set of defaults. For this paper we
also make the simplifying assumption that ∆ is “consis-
tent”, in the sense that its set of material counterparts
∆→ = {λ → χ | λ ⇒ χ ∈ ∆} is consistent. Using
a procedure given in (Pearl 1990) (or, equivalently, in
(Lehmann & Magidor 1992)) we may partition ∆ into
∆ = (∆0, . . . ,∆n), where the ∆i correspond, in a pre-
cise sense, to “levels of specificity” – given a default
δ ∈ ∆, the larger the i for which δ ∈ ∆i, the more spe-
cific are the situations to which δ is applicable. Follow-
ing (Pearl 1990), we call this partition the Z-partition
of ∆. Like many methods of default entailment (see
(Benferhat et al. 1993) for several examples), the lexi-
cographic closure can be based on a method of choosing
maximal consistent subsets of ∆→. More precisely the
lexicographic closure is a member of a family of conse-
quence relations |∼∆≪, where ≪ is an ordering on 2
∆,
and, for all θ, φ ∈ L, we have
θ |∼∆≪ φ iff for all Γ ⊆ ∆ such that Γ
→ ∪ {θ} is
consistent and Γ is ≪-maximal amongst
such subsets, we have Γ→ ∪ {θ} |= φ.
To specify the lexicographic closure we instantiate the
order ≪ above, with the help of the Z-partition, as
follows: Given subsets A,B ⊆ ∆ let Ai = A ∩∆i and
Bi = B∩∆i for each i = 0, . . . , n. We define an ordering
≪lex on 2
∆ by:
A≪lex B iff there exists i such that |Ai| < |Bi| and,
for all j > i, |Aj | = |Bj |.
(The reason for the name “lexicographic closure” should
now be clear.) The lexicographic closure |∼∆lex is then
just defined to be |∼∆≪lex .
How successful is |∼∆lex in achieving the goals of de-
fault reasoning? We refer the reader to (Lehmann 1995)
for the details. However, the internal, closure properties
of |∼∆lex can be summed up by the following proposition,
which can be found jointly in (Benferhat et al. 1993)
and (Lehmann 1995).
Proposition 1 The binary relation |∼∆lex is a rational
consequence relation (see (Kraus, Lehmann, & Magi-
dor 1990; Lehmann & Magidor 1992)). Furthermore,
|∼∆lex is consistency preserving, i.e., for all θ, θ |∼
∆
lex ⊥
implies θ |= ⊥.
Now we already know (see, for example, (Freund 1993;
Lehmann & Magidor 1992)) that rational consequence
relations may be represented by finite sequences ~U =
(U0, . . . ,Uk) of mutually disjoint subsets of W in the
following sense: Given such a sequence ~U and θ ∈ L we
set rank
~U (θ) = the least i such that Ui ∩ Sθ 6= ∅. If
no such i exists then we set rank
~U (θ) = ∞. If we then
define a binary relation |∼~U on L by setting
1
θ |∼~U φ iff either rank
~U (θ) < rank
~U (θ ∧ ¬φ)
or rank
~U (θ) =∞
then |∼~U forms a rational consequence relation, while
moreover every rational consequence relation arises in
this way from some sequence ~U .2 The intuition behind
the sequences ~U is that they represent a “ranking” of
the worlds in W according to their plausibility – the
lower the i for which w ∈ Ui, the more plausible, in
relation to the other worlds, it is considered to be. If
w 6∈ Ui for all i then we may take w to be considered
“impossible”.
One thing to note about the definition of |∼~U given
above is that we allow ∅ to appear, possibly more than
once, in ~U .3 This freedom comes in useful when proving
some of our results. It also has the effect that the map-
ping ~U 7→|∼~U detailed above is not injective – given a
rational consequence relation |∼ there will be many (in
fact infinitely many) sequences ~U such that |∼=|∼~U .
4
Another thing to note about |∼~U is that |∼~U will be
consistency preserving iff
⋃k
i=0 Ui = W , while it will
1Note the first clause includes the case rank
~U(θ ∧ ¬φ) =
∞ and rank
~U (θ) 6=∞.
2Such sequences are clearly equivalent to the ranked
models used to characterise rational consequence relations
in (Lehmann & Magidor 1992).
3This approach carries us very close to the “semi-
quantitative” approaches of (Spohn 1988; Weydert 1996;
Williams 1994), which use an explicit ranking function as
a starting point rather than deriving one from a sequence of
world-sets. Our approach, though, remains squarely quali-
tative in character.
4Since clearly we can insert as many copies of ∅ into
the sequence (U0, . . . ,Uk) as we wish without changing the
relation |∼~U .
be trivial, i.e., will satisfy θ |∼~U φ for all θ and φ, iff⋃k
i=0 Ui = ∅. We make the following definitions:
Definition 1 Let ~U = (U0, . . . ,Uk) be a finite sequence
of mutually disjoint subsets of W . We shall say that
~U is full iff
⋃k
i=0 Ui = W and that
~U is empty iff⋃k
i=0 Ui = ∅. We let Υ denote the set of all such
~U
which are either full or empty.
Hence Proposition 1 tells us that there must exist a
full sequence ~U ∈ Υ such that θ |∼∆lex φ iff θ |∼~U φ.
What form does ~U take here? The answer is given in
(Benferhat et al. 1993) and (Lehmann 1995) (and is, in
fact, used to define |∼∆lex in the latter). In this paper we
show that we can arrive at this answer via a different
route.
Belief Revision and Epistemic
Entrenchment
Belief revision is concerned with the following problem:
How should an agent revise her beliefs upon receiv-
ing some new information which may, possibly, con-
tradict some of her current beliefs? The most popu-
lar basic framework within which this question is stud-
ied is the one laid down by Alchourr´on, Ga¨rdenfors
and Makinson (AGM) in (Alchourr´on, Ga¨rdenfors, &
Makinson 1985). In that framework an agent’s epis-
temic state is represented as a logically closed set of
sentences called a belief set, and the new information,
or epistemic input, is represented as a single sentence.
AGM propose a number of postulates which a reason-
able operation of revision should satisfy. In particular,
the revised belief set should contain the epistemic in-
put and should be consistent.5 In order to meet these
requirements, in the general case when the input is in-
consistent with the prior belief set, the agent is forced
to give up some of her prior beliefs. One way of de-
termining precisely which sentences the agent should
give up in this situation is to assign to the agent an
E-relation  on L (see, for example, (Ga¨rdenfors 1988;
Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson 1994; Nayak 1994; Rott 1992a;
Rott 1996)).
The intuitive meaning behind E-relations is that
φ  ψ should hold iff the agent finds it at least as easy
to give up φ as she does ψ, i.e., her belief in ψ is at least
as entrenched as her belief in φ. In cases of conflict the
agent should then give up those sentences which are
less entrenched. In what follows we use ≺ to denote
the strict part of , i.e, θ ≺ φ iff θ  φ and not(φ  θ).
We follow (Nayak 1994) in formally defining E-relations
as follows:
Definition 2 An epistemic entrenchment relation (E-
relation) (on L) is a relation ⊆ L× L which satisfies
5Unless the epistemic input itself is inconsistent. See
(Ga¨rdenfors 1988) for the full list of postulates with detailed
discussion.
the following conditions for all θ, φ, ψ ∈ L,
(E1) If θ  φ and φ  ψ then θ  ψ
(transitivity)
(E2) If θ |= φ then θ  φ (dominance)
(E3) θ  θ ∧ φ or φ  θ ∧ φ (conjunctiveness)
(E4) Given there exists ψ ∈ L such that ⊥ ≺ ψ,
if θ  φ for all θ ∈ L, then |= φ
(maximality)
If there is no ψ ∈ L such that ⊥ ≺ ψ, equivalently,
if θ  φ holds for all θ, φ, then we call  the absurd
E-relation. The original definition of E-relation, such
as is found in (Ga¨rdenfors 1988), is given relative to a
belief set. However, as is noted in (Nayak 1994), E-
relations contain enough information by themselves for
the belief set to be extracted from it. The belief set
Bel() associated with the E-relation  is defined as:
Bel() =
{
{θ | ⊥ ≺ θ} if ⊥ ≺ θ, for some θ,
L otherwise.
The belief set associated with an E-relation was called
its epistemic content in (Nayak 1994).
E-relations and Rational Consequence
We now bring in the connection between E-relations, as
they have been defined here, and rational consequence
relations. The following result is virtually the same as
one given in (Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson 1994).
Proposition 2 Let |∼ be a rational consequence rela-
tion which is either consistency preserving or trivial. If
we define, from |∼, a binary relation ∼ on L by set-
ting, for all θ, φ ∈ L,
θ ∼ φ iff ¬θ ∨ ¬φ 6|∼ θ or ¬φ |∼ ⊥, (1)
then ∼ forms an E-relation. Conversely if, given an
E-relation  we define a binary relation |∼ on L by
setting, for all θ, φ ∈ L,
θ |∼ φ iff ¬θ ≺ ¬θ ∨ φ or ⊤  ¬θ
then |∼ forms a rational consequence relation which
is either consistency preserving or trivial. Furthermore
the identity |∼=|∼∼ holds.
So there is a bijection between rational consequence re-
lations which are either consistency preserving or triv-
ial, and E-relations. Essentially they are different ways
of describing the same thing, and so an operation for
changing one automatically gives us an operation for
changing the other. This observation is at the heart of
the present paper. Given ~U ∈ Υ we shall denote by ~U
the E-relation defined from |∼~U via (1) above. Since
we have already seen that rational consequence rela-
tions which are either consistency preserving or trivial
are characterised by the sequences in Υ, Proposition 2
leads us to the following result.
Proposition 3 Let  be a binary relation on L. Then
 is an E-relation iff =~U for some
~U ∈ Υ.
Note again that ~U=~V does not imply
~U = ~V . Also
note that ~U will be absurd iff
~U is empty. It is straight-
forward to prove the following.
Proposition 4 Let ~U ∈ Υ and θ ∈ L. Then
θ ∈ Bel(~U) iff ⊤ |∼~U θ.
Revision of E-relations
Nayak (Nayak 1994) deviates from the basic AGM
framework in two ways. Firstly, in order to help
us deal with iterated revision (see (Boutilier 1996;
Darwiche & Pearl 1997; Williams 1994)), he argues that
we need not only a description of the new belief set
which results from a revision, but also a new E-relation
which can then guide any further revision. Thus we
should enlarge our epistemic state to consist of a belief
set together with an E-relation and then perform revi-
sion on this larger state. In fact, since, as we have seen,
the belief set may be determined from the E-relation,
we may take our epistemic states to be just E-relations.6
Secondly, he suggests that the epistemic input should
consist not of a single sentence, but rather another E-
relation. (See (Nayak 1994) for motivation.) He claims
it is then possible, in his framework, to capture the re-
vision of E-relations by arbitrary sets of sentences E by
first converting the set E into a suitable E-relation E
and then revising by E. We shall discuss this point
further in the next section. In this section we shall use
the characterisation of E-relations given in Proposition
3 to describe Nayak’s proposal of how one E-relation
should be revised by another to obtain a new E-relation.
The ideas behind this formulation can also be seen in
(Nayak 1994).
Let K be the prior E-relation and let E be the
input E-relation. By Proposition 3, we know that there
exist ~U , ~V ∈ Υ such that K=~U and E=~V . Hence
we may reduce the question of entrenchment revision to
a question of how to revise one sequence of world-sets
by another. More precisely, we can define a sequence
revision function ∗ : Υ × Υ → Υ, where ~U ∗ ~V is the
result of revising ~U by ~V, and then simply lift this to
an entrenchment revision function by setting
K ∗ E=~U∗~V . (2)
(The context will always make it clear whether we are
considering ∗ as an operation on sequences or an op-
eration on E-relations.) All this must be independent
of precisely which ~U and ~V are chosen to represent K
and E respectively. The definition for the sequence re-
vision function ∗ which we choose, motivated purely in
order to arrive at Nayak’s entrenchment revision func-
tion, is the following:
6In this context of iterated revision, the consideration of
more comprehensive epistemic states of which a belief set is
but one component has also been suggested in (Darwiche &
Pearl 1997) and (Friedman & Halpern 1999).
Definition 3 We define the function ∗ : Υ×Υ→ Υ by
setting , for all ~U = (U0, . . . ,Uk) and ~V = (V0, . . . ,Vm),
~U∗~V =


(U0 ∩ V0,U1 ∩ V0, . . . ,Uk ∩ V0,
U0 ∩ V1,U1 ∩ V1, . . . ,Uk ∩ V1,
. . . ,
U0 ∩ Vm,U1 ∩ Vm, . . . ,Uk ∩ Vm).
if ~U is full
~V otherwise.
Clearly it is the case that ~U ∗ ~V is always full, unless ~V
is empty, in which case so is ~U ∗ ~V. Hence we certainly
have ~U ∗ ~V ∈ Υ. The following proposition assures us
that ∗, when lifted to an operation on E-relations, is
well-defined.
Proposition 5 Let ~Ui, ~Vi ∈ Υ for i = 1, 2. Then
~U1=~U2 and ~V1=~V2 implies ~U1∗~V1=~U2∗~V2 .
From now on we will follow Nayak and use K∗E as
an abbreviation for K ∗ E . The authors of (Nayak,
Nelson, & Polansky 1996) propose the following postu-
lates for the revision of E-relations:
(E1∗) K∗E is an E-relation.
(E2∗) If θ ≺E φ then θ ≺K∗E φ.
(E3∗) If both θ E φ and φ E θ and if, for all λ,
χ such that θ ∧ φ |= χ and θ ≺ χ, we have
λ K χ iff λ E χ, then θ K∗E φ iff θ K φ.
We refer the reader to (Nayak, Nelson, & Polansky
1996) for the justification of these postulates. Any
operation of revision of E-relations which satisfies the
above three conditions is called a well-behaved entrench-
ment revision operation in (Nayak, Nelson, & Polansky
1996), where it is shown that there is, in fact, pre-
cisely one well-behaved entrenchment revision opera-
tion, namely the one given in (Nayak 1994). Thus the
above three postulates serve to characterise Nayak’s re-
vision method. Our revision operation, defined by Def-
inition 3 via (2) above, also satisfies (E1∗)–(E3∗) and
hence is semantically equivalent to the operation con-
structed in (Nayak 1994).
Theorem 1 If we set K∗E=~U∗~V where
~U (~V) is
chosen so that K=~U (E=~V) then the operator
∗ satisfies (E1∗), (E2∗) and (E3∗).
One advantage of this particular formulation is that
it is relatively easy to show properties of the well-
behaved entrenchment revision operation ∗. For exam-
ple, the following proposition regarding sequence revi-
sion is straightforward to prove.
Proposition 6
Let ~U , ~V , ~W ∈ Υ and suppose ~V is not empty. Then
(~U ∗ ~V) ∗ ~W = ~U ∗ (~V ∗ ~W).
This proposition, in turn, gives us the following interest-
ing associativity property of the induced entrenchment
revision operation.
Proposition 7 Let i be an E-relation for i = 1, 2, 3.
Then, if 2 is not absurd, we have (1 ∗ 2)∗ 3=
1 ∗(2 ∗ 3).
Generating E-relations from Sets of
Sentences
As we said in the last section, Nayak proposes that
his way of revising one E-relation by another allows
a way of modelling the revision of an E-relation by
a set of sentences E by first converting, according to
some suitable method, the set E into an E-relation
E and then revising by E . The question of which
“suitable method” we should use for generating E
is clearly an interesting question in itself. A strong
feeling is that the relation E should adequately con-
vey the informational content of E, but what does this
mean? An obvious first requirement of E would seem
to be Bel(E) = Cn(E), but there are different ways
in which this can be achieved. The definition which
Nayak seems to advocate is the following, based on an
idea in (Rott 1992a), and expressed via its strict part.
θ ≺E φ iff E 6|= ⊥, 6|= θ and for all E
′ ⊆ E such that
E′ ∪ {¬φ} is consistent, there exists
E′′ ⊆ E such that E′ ⊂ E′′ and E′′ ∪ {¬θ}
is consistent.
The clause “E 6|= ⊥” in the above merely ensures
that if E is inconsistent then E is absurd, while the
clause “ 6|= θ” ensures that tautologies are maximally
entrenched. The main body of the definition essentially
says that φ should be strictly more entrenched than θ
iff each ⊆-maximal subset of E which fails to imply φ
may be strictly enlarged to a subset of E which fails
to imply θ. The problem with defining E in this way
is that it will fail, in general, to be an E-relation. In
particular it will not necessarily satisfy (E1).7 How can
we modify/extend it so as to obtain an E-relation? The
possibility we choose is to compare the sets which fail
to imply θ and φ by cardinality rather than inclusion:8
Definition 4 Given a set E ⊆ L, define a relation
≺E⊆ L× L by, for all θ, φ ∈ L,
θ ≺E φ iff E 6|= ⊥, 6|= θ and for all E′ ⊆ E such that
E′ ∪ {¬φ} is consistent, there exists
E′′ ⊆ E such that |E′| < |E′′| and
E′′ ∪ {¬θ} is consistent.
Note that this definition does indeed extend the “old”
definition given above. That E defined by Definition
4 is a genuine E-relation will follow once we have found
a sequence ~U ∈ Υ such that E=~U . We do this as
follows. Let us assume for simplicity that E is finite
with |E| = k. Then, for each i = 0, . . . , k, we set
UEi =
{
{w ∈W | |sentE(w)| = k − i} if E 6|= ⊥
∅ otherwise.
7It should be noted, however, that E so defined does
still enjoy several interesting properties. In fact it belongs
to Rott’s family of generalized E-relations (Rott 1992b).
8Possibilities in this spirit are also discussed in (Benfer-
hat et al. 1993) (Section 2) and (Lehmann 1995) (Section
8). See also the closely related Section 5 of (Freund 1999).
So, in the principal case when E is consistent, UEi con-
tains those worlds which satisfy precisely k− i elements
of E. Let ~UE = (UE0 , . . . ,U
E
k ).
Proposition 8 If E |= ⊥ then ~UE is empty, while if
E 6|= ⊥ then ~UE is full (and so, either way, ~UE ∈ Υ).
In both cases we have E=~UE . Hence E is an E-
relation.
Note that, with this notation, we have ~U∅ = (W ).
Hence we can think of ∅ as being the initial epistemic
state in which each world is equally plausible.
How does E portray the informational content of
E? The sequence ~UE shows us clearly. First of all
it is easy to see that E satisfies the basic require-
ment of Bel(E) = Cn(E) (in particular the only sen-
tences believed in ∅ are the tautologies) since the most
plausible worlds in ~UE , i.e., the worlds in UE0 , are pre-
cisely those worlds which satisfy every sentence in E.
The big question is how does ~UE classify the worlds
which do not satisfy every sentence in E? The an-
swer is that it considers one such world more plausible
than another iff it satisfies strictly more sentences in
E. This makes the relation E dependent on the syn-
tactic form, not just the semantic form, of E, i.e., we
can have Cn(E1) = Cn(E2) without necessarily having
E1=E2 . One situation where this method might be
deemed suitable is if we want to regard the elements of
E as items of information coming from different, inde-
pendent sources.
From now on, for the special case when E is a single-
ton, we shall write θ rather than {θ} etc. We have
the following partial generalisation of Proposition 4.
Proposition 9 Let ~U ∈ Υ be full and let θ, φ ∈ L.
Then φ ∈ Bel(~U ∗ θ) iff θ |∼~U φ.
We are now ready to give the sequence ~U such that
θ |∼~U φ iff θ |∼
∆
lex φ. Let (∆0, . . . ,∆n) be the Z-
partition of ∆. Then, to obtain our special ~U we
start at the sequence (W ) and then successively re-
vise, using our sequence revision function ∗, by ~U∆
→
i
for i = 0, 1, . . . , n. Recalling that (W ) = ~U∅ we may
give our main result. Recall that we are assuming ∆ is
finite and that ∆→ is consistent.
Theorem 2 Let ∆ be a set of defaults with associated
Z-partition (∆0, . . . ,∆n). Then, for all θ, φ ∈ L, we
have θ |∼∆lex φ iff θ |∼~U∅∗~U∆
→
0 ∗···∗~U∆
→
n
φ.
Note that, by Proposition 6 and the assumption that
∆→ is consistent, the term ~U∅ ∗ ~U∆
→
0 ∗ · · · ∗ ~U∆
→
n is
independent of the bracketing. Similar remarks apply
(using Proposition 7) to the next result. Using Propo-
sitions 8 and 9 we may re-express Theorem 2 as:
Corollary 1 Let ∆ be a set of defaults with associated
Z-partition (∆0, . . . ,∆n). Then, for all θ, φ ∈ L, we
have θ |∼∆lex φ iff φ ∈ Bel(∅ ∗ ∆→0 ∗ · · · ∗ ∆→n ∗ θ).
If we go further and actually identify a revision of the
form  ∗ E with  ∗E then we have the following
characterisation of the lexicographic closure.
Corollary 2 Let ∆ be a set of defaults with associated
Z-partition (∆0, . . . ,∆n). Then, for all θ, φ ∈ L, we
have θ |∼∆lex φ iff φ ∈ Bel(∅ ∗∆
→
0 ∗ · · · ∗∆
→
n ∗ θ).
Hence, using this particular method of revision and this
particular way of interpreting revision by a set of sen-
tences, we have shown that θ |∼∆lex φ iff φ is believed
after first successively revising the initial epistemic state
by the set of sentences ∆→i for i = 0, 1, . . . , n, and then
revising by θ.
Further Work
The developments in the previous sections have raised
a couple of questions regarding both belief revision and
default entailment. Firstly, while there have been sev-
eral papers published concerned with iterated revision
by single sentences, and also some concerned with re-
vision by sets of sentences,9 there seems to be little in
the way of any systematic study of iterated revision
by sets of sentences.10 Darwiche and Pearl (Darwiche
& Pearl 1997) provide a postulational approach to the
question of iterated revision of epistemic states by sin-
gle sentences. In this approach they take the concept
of epistemic state to be primitive, assuming only that
from each such state Ψ we may extract a belief set (in
the usual AGM sense of the term) B(Ψ) representing
the set of sentences accepted in that state. For example
Darwiche and Pearl’s second postulate may be stated
as
If φ |= ¬θ then B((Ψ ∗ θ) ∗ φ) = B(Ψ ∗ φ).
(For the other postulates and their justifications see
(Darwiche & Pearl 1997).) It is not difficult to see
that, if we identify epistemic state here with E-relation
and take B() = Bel(), then the method proposed
by Nayak, on its restriction to single sentences11 sat-
isfies all of Darwiche and Pearl’s postulates. However,
it also satisfies some interesting properties in the gen-
eral case. For example, given an E-relation  and
E1 ⊆ E2 ⊆ L such that E2 is consistent, we have
( ∗E2) ∗ E1 = ( ∗E2 − E1) ∗ E1. In particular,
if {θ, φ} is consistent, we have ( ∗{θ, φ}) ∗ φ = (
∗θ) ∗ φ. (Note this is a stronger statement than just
Bel(( ∗{θ, φ}) ∗ φ) = Bel(( ∗θ) ∗ φ).) The question
of whether this, or any other, property of iterated revi-
sion by sets is desirable seems to be a question worth
investigating. Another question is: Can we, by mod-
ifying the various parameters involved in this revision
process, model any of the other existing methods of de-
fault entailment, apart from the lexicographic closure,
or even construct new ones? For example, given our
9Either directly (e.g. (Zhang 1996)) or indirectly, via the
study of contraction by a set of sentences (e.g. (Fuhrmann
& Hansson 1994)). See (Ga¨rdenfors 1988) for a description
of contractions and their close relationship with revision.
10An exception, in a slightly more complex framework, is
(Weydert 1999).
11We obviously interpret single sentences here as singleton
sets.
set of defaults ∆ and its Z-partition (∆0, . . . ,∆n), let
Θi =
⋃
i≤j ∆j for each i = 1, . . . , n. Then, by the above
comments, we may rewrite Corollary 2 as
θ |∼∆lex φ iff φ ∈ Bel(∅ ∗Θ
→
0 ∗ · · · ∗Θ
→
n ∗ θ).
We conjecture that if we now replace each Θ→i in the
above by
∧
Θ→i (i.e., the conjunction, in some order, of
the sentences in Θ→i ), then we obtain the rational clo-
sure (Lehmann & Magidor 1992) (which is semantically
equivalent to System Z (Pearl 1990)) of ∆, instead of
the lexicographic closure. This and other variations are
the subject of ongoing study. Finally, note that, since
we assumed at the outset that our language L is based
on only finitely many propositional variables, and also
that ∆ is a finite set of defaults, we have not needed
in this paper to confront the question of revision by in-
finite sets of sentences. It remains to be seen to what
extent the ideas in this paper can be extended to cover
this more general situation.12
Conclusion
In this paper we have taken a particular model of de-
fault reasoning – the lexicographic closure – and re-cast
it in terms of iterated belief revision by sets of sentences,
using the particular, independently motivated, revision
model of Nayak. In the process of doing this, a cou-
ple of interesting avenues for further exploration have
suggested themselves. In particular, the questions of
which properties of iterated multiple revision should be
deemed desirable, and of how we may apply the prin-
ciples underlying the AGM theory of belief revision in
the context of default reasoning.
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